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Should State Courts be Required to Follow the Decisions of Lower Federal Courts when
Interpreting Questions of Federal Law?
Introduction
At first glance, the rule that state courts are not bound by decisions of the lower federal
courts in interpreting questions of federal law seems uncontroversial. Yet the roots of that rule
are far from clear. 1 The United States Supreme Court has not definitively stated the rule. 2
While the majority of courts seem to adhere to the rule, 3 a few courts have held that state courts
are bound by decisions of the lower federal courts under certain circumstances. 4 Should state

1

For example, the Nowak and Rotunda treatise on constitutional law states the rule, but cites no authority for it. See
JOHN E. NOWAK AND RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 1.6 (c) (6th ed. 2000).
2

See Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 58 n.11 (1997) (citing Yniguez v. Arizona, 939 F.2d
727, 736 (9th Cir. 1991)) (referencing a “remarkable passage” in a 9th Circuit opinion that questioned the rule, then
providing a “But cf.” cite that references no majority opinions of the United States Supreme Court that are directly
on point); State v. Burnett, 755 N.E.2d 857, 860 (Ohio 2001) (“The question of whether a state court is required to
follow a federal trial court’s interpretation of federal constitutional law is largely unsettled, and the United States
Supreme Court has yet to definitively address the subject.”). See generally Donald H. Zeigler, Gazing into the
Crystal Ball: Reflections on the Standards State Judges Should Use to Ascertain Federal Law, 40 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 1143 (1999) (explaining the different methods state courts use in dealing with lower federal court decisional
law).
3

See, e.g., People v. Walker, 2004 WL 3248429 (Mich. Ct. App. 2005) (“[W]e are not bound by decisions of lower
federal courts.”); Burgess v. E.L.C. Elec., Inc., 825 N.E.2d 1, 9 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005) (“[W]e note that decisions of
the United States Supreme Court pertaining to federal issues are binding on state courts but that decisions of lower
federal courts, although they may be persuasive, are not binding upon state courts.”); Brown v. State, 9 A.3d 23, 28
n.3 (N.Y. App. Div. 2004) ([“T]he courts of this state are not bound by the interpretation of the U.S. Constitution by
lower federal courts.”); People v. Romero, 99 Cal. App.4th 1418, 1430 (2002) (“Although lower federal court
decisions are entitled to great weight, we are not bound by their decisions.”); ACE Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Comm.
of Revenue, 770 N.E.2d 980, 986 n.8 (Mass. 2002) (“Although we are not bound by decisions of Federal Courts
(other than the United States Supreme Court) on matters of federal law, we give respectful consideration to such
lower Federal court decisions as seem persuasive.”) (citations and quotations omitted); State v. Mack, 66 S.W.3d
706, 710 (Mo. 2002) (“[G]eneral declarations of law made by lower federal courts do not bind this Court.”); Ex
parte Graves, 70 S.W.3d 103, 124 n.3 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002) (“Moreover, we are not bound by lower federal court
opinions interpreting constitutional rights, although they do present persuasive authority.”); Brotman v. East Lake
Creek Ranch, 31 P.3d 888, 894 (Colo. 2001) (“[W]e are not bound by decisions of lower federal courts.”).
4

For example, the Illinois Supreme Court has held that “the decisions of the Federal courts interpreting a Federal act
such as the FHSA [the Federal Hazardous Substances Act] are controlling upon Illinois courts, in order that the act
be given uniform application.” Busch v. Graphic Color Corp., 662 N.E.2d 397, 403 (Ill. 1996). However, in later
cases, the Illinois Supreme Court seems to have tempered that statement. See, e.g., Weiland v. Telectronics Pacing
Syst., Inc., 721 N.E.2d 1149, 1154 (Ill. 1999) (“This court need not follow Seventh Circuit precedent interpreting a
federal statute where, as here, the Supreme Court has not ruled on the question presented, there is a split of authority

2

courts be bound by lower federal court decisional law? If not, should they nonetheless follow
precedent from the circuit in which they sit as a prudential matter? This paper will begin by
examining the closest thing we have to definitive authority regarding the rule—affirmative
statements by individual justices of the United States Supreme Court. If it were to be held that
state courts are required to follow lower federal court precedent, the source of such a doctrine
would have to be the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution. Thus, the paper will
give a very brief overview of the Supremacy Clause and the institution of judicial review. It will
then proceed to examine four arguments for and against the rule, taking into account some of the
unique federalism concerns that arise in this area. Next, the paper will examine New Mexico
caselaw in order to conduct a practical study of how state courts deal with circuit precedent on
questions of federal law. In doing so, the paper will pose the question of whether there are
certain areas of substantive federal law in which state courts should give greater deference than
usual to the opinions of the lower federal courts.

among the federal circuit courts of appeals, and, we believe, the case from the Seventh Circuit was wrongly
decided.”).
See also People v. Riggs, 568 N.W.2d 101, 106 (Mich. App. 1997) (“Michigan adheres to the rule that a
state court is bound by the authoritative holdings of federal courts regarding federal questions when there is no
conflict. However, where an issue has divided the circuits of the federal court of appeals, the Court is free to choose
the most appropriate view.”) (citations omitted); Fall River County v. South Dakota, 552 N.W.2d 620, 628 (S.D.
1996) (“We are bound by the decisions of the federal courts in their interpretation of a federal statute.”) (quotations
omitted); Scovill Mfg. Co. v. Skaggs Pay Less Drug Stores, 291 P.2d 936, 938-39 (Cal. 1956) (en banc) (“The
decision of the Court of Appeals in the Schwegmann case is a clear and unqualified approval of the McGuire Act
and we are bound thereby on matters relating to the federal law.”).
In dicta, subsequently criticized by the U.S. Supreme Court, see supra note 2, the Ninth Circuit stated:
“Despite the authorities that take the view that the state courts are free to ignore decisions of the lower federal courts
on federal questions, we have serious doubts as to the wisdom of this view. Having chosen to create the lower
federal courts, Congress may have intended…the federal courts [] to have the final word on questions of federal law.
The contrary view could lead to considerable friction between the state and federal courts as well as duplicative
litigation.” Yniguez v. Arizona, 939 F.2d 727, 736 (9th Cir. 1991).

3

I.

Statements of the Rule

While the United States Supreme Court has not ruled on whether state courts must follow
the decisions of lower federal courts on issues of federal law, 5 several individual Justices have
stated that they need not. The clearest statement of the rule appears in a concurring opinion by
Justice Thomas. In Lockhart v. Fretwell, 6 a majority of the Supreme Court reversed the Eighth
Circuit’s affirmance of a grant of habeus corpus relief (based on a Strickland 7 claim for
ineffective assistance of counsel) to a prisoner who had been convicted in the Arkansas courts.
The Eight Circuit had ruled that the prisoner met the Strickland test, because his trial counsel had
failed to raise an argument based on a prior Eight Circuit case that might have afforded relief,
even though that case had been subsequently overruled by the Eighth Circuit. 8 The Supreme
Court majority noted that the Eighth Circuit “believed that the Arkansas trial court was bound
under the Supremacy Clause to obey the Eighth Circuit’s interpretation of the Federal
Constitution.” 9 The majority did not address this statement, instead reversing the grant of
habeus relief because the defendant had failed to meet the elements of the Strickland test. 10

5

See supra note 2.

6

506 U.S. 364 (1993).

7

See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). Strickland provides the test for whether a lawyer’s
performance violates a defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel. To prevail on a Strickland claim, a
defendant must show (1) that the attorney’s performance was deficient, and (2) that the defendant was prejudiced in
that “counsel’s errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable.” Id. at
687.
8

Fretwell, 506 U.S. at 368.

9

Id. at 368. In dissent, Justice Stevens did not agree that the Eighth Circuit believed the Arkansas courts to be
bound by Eighth Circuit precedent. Id. at 385 n. 8. What the Eighth Circuit actually said was as follows: “[S]ince
state courts are bound by the Supremacy Clause to obey federal constitutional law, we conclude that a reasonable
state trial court would have sustained an objection based on Collins had Fretwell’s attorney made one.” Fretwell v.
Lockhart, 946 F.2d 571, 577 (1991). “Collins” refers to the Eighth Circuit precedent that the Eighth Circuit later
overruled. See Collins v. Lockhart, 754 F.2d 258 (8th Cir. 1985), overruled by Perry v. Lockhart, 871 F.2d 1384 (8th
Cir. 1989).
10

Fretwell, 506 U.S. at 371.

4

Justice Thomas agreed with the majority’s Strickland analysis, but wrote separately to
address “a fundamental misunderstanding of the Supremacy Clause on the part of the Court of
Appeals.” 11 Arguing that the Arkansas courts were not bound to follow decisions of the Eighth
Circuit, Justice Thomas said,
The Supremacy Clause demands that state law yield to federal law, but neither
federal supremacy nor any other principle of federal law requires that a state
court’s interpretation of federal law give way to a (lower) federal court’s
interpretation. In our federal system, a state trial court’s interpretation of federal
law is no less authoritative that that of the federal court of appeals in whose
circuit the trial court is located. An Arkansas trial court is bound by this Court’s
(and by the Arkansas Supreme Court’s and Arkansas Court of Appeals’)
interpretation of federal law, but if it follows the Eighth Circuit’s interpretation of
federal law, it does so only because it chooses to and not because it must. 12
While it is difficult to infer anything from silence, it is interesting that the majority opinion failed
to address this question, even though it agreed that Eighth Circuit had perceived the Arkansas
courts to be bound by Eighth Circuit precedent.
Justice Rehnquist has also stated the rule in a concurring opinion. In Steffel v.
Thompson, 13 the Supreme Court clarified the proposition, set forth in Younger v. Harris 14 and
Samuels v. Mackell, 15 that absent unusual circumstances, federal courts should not enjoin
enforcement of a state criminal statute when there is already a state criminal proceeding pending
against the federal court plaintiff. The Steffel Court held that a federal court may issue a

11

Id. at 375 (Thomas, J., concurring).

12

Id. at 376 (Thomas, J., concurring) (citations omitted). Notably, Justice Thomas provided only three citations for
this statement—a concurring opinion by Justice Rehnquist, (Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452 (1974)) a Seventh
Circuit case, (United States ex rel. Lawrence v. Woods, 432 F.2d 1072 (1971)) and a law review article (Shapiro,
State Courts and Federal Declaratory Judgments, 74 NW. U.L. REV. 759 (1979)).
13

415 U.S. 452 (1974).

14

401 U.S. 37 (1971).

15

401 U.S. 66 (1971).

5

declaratory judgment that a state statute is unconstitutional when no state criminal proceeding is
pending and the federal court plaintiff has shown “a genuine threat of enforcement of a disputed
state criminal statute.” 16 Justice Rehnquist concurred in the majority opinion, and added, “I do
note that the federal decision [a declaratory judgment holding the state statute unconstitutional]
would not be accorded the stare decisis effect in state court that it would have in a subsequent
proceeding within the same federal jurisdiction. Although the state court would not be
compelled to follow the federal holding, the opinion might, of course, be viewed as highly
persuasive.” 17
Most state courts have also ruled that they need not follow circuit precedent. 18 But
generally, these courts have not provided much in the way of rationale for their decisions. 19 In
the following sections, this paper will first examine the possibility that lower federal court
decisional law constitutes the “supreme law of the land” under the Supremacy Clause, and will
then discuss various arguments in support of and opposition to the rule that state courts are not
bound by lower federal court precedent when interpreting federal law.
II.

The Supremacy Clause, the Power of Judicial Review, and the Question of
the “Supremacy” of Lower Federal Court Decisions

It has long been clear that under the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution,
all courts in the United States, state and federal, are bound by the decisions of the United States

16

415 U.S. at 475.

17

Id. at 483 n.3 (Rehnquist, J., concurring).

18

See supra note 3.

19

Zeigler, supra note 2, at 1151-52 (“The state courts promptly split on whether they were bound by lower federal
court decisions interpreting federal law. Discussions tended to be wholly conclusory. Courts simply stated that they
were bound—or not bound—and generally provided neither citation nor analysis.”) (footnotes omitted).

6

Supreme Court on issues of federal law. 20 If it were to be decided that state courts were also
bound by decisions of the lower federal courts, the source of such a rule would presumably also
be the Supremacy Clause. Thus a brief examination of the history and application of the
Supremacy Clause is helpful. The Clause states,
The Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in
pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the
Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the
Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or
Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding. 21
Interestingly, the term “Laws” appears to refer only to congressionally enacted legislation, and if
so, the Supremacy Clause makes no mention of judge-made law.
The Supremacy Clause’s failure to mention judge-made law is likely a result of the
Clause’s goal, which was unrelated judge-made law. The Framers’ goal in adopting the
Supremacy Clause was to establish the legislative preemption doctrine—that federal legislation
overrides conflicting state legislation. 22 The Supremacy Clause derives in part from a proposal
rejected by the Constitutional Convention, which would have allowed Congress to “negative all
laws passed by the several States, contravening in the opinion of the National Legislature the
articles of Union.” 23 Thus, under the rejected proposal, Congress would have had the power to
veto state law that it thought to be unconstitutional. The proposal was ultimately rejected

20

See, e.g., Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1, 9 (1995) (“State courts, in appropriate cases, are not merely free to—they
are bound to—interpret the United States Constitution. In doing so, they are not free from the final authority of this
Court.”); Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 572-73 (1832) (opinion of Justice McLean) (“It appears, then,
that on all questions arising under the laws of a state, the decisions of the courts of such state form a rule for the
decisions of this court, and that on all questions arising under the laws of the United States, the decisions of this
court form a rule for the decisions of the state courts.”).
21

U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.

22

See FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 793-95 (1982) (O’Connor, J., concurring in the judgment in part and
dissenting in part).

23

Id. at 794 (O’Connor, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part) (quoting 1 Farrand 21).

7

because delegates thought it would improperly deprive the states of power over local issues. 24
As a compromise, the delegates settled on the Supremacy Clause. 25 According to Justice
O’Connor, the effect of the Supremacy Clause was to give the federal government “the power to
enact its own laws and to enforce those laws over conflicting state legislation.” 26 Thus, given
the goal sought to be achieved by the Supremacy Clause, it is not a surprise that the Clause does
not speak directly to the effect of federal court decisions.
Another reason for the Clause’s failure to mention judge-made law is that the
Constitution does not explicitly provide for judicial review of legislation; 27 rather the Supreme
Court gave itself that power in Marbury v. Madison. 28 But despite the Supremacy Clause’s
failure to mention judge-made law, the Supreme Court has made clear that, as a result of the
intersection of the Clause and the Marbury power of judicial review, its interpretation of the
constitution stands on the same footing as the constitution itself. In Cooper v. Aaron, 29 where
the Supreme Court held that resistant Arkansas officials were bound by the Court’s decision in
Brown v. Board of Education, 30 the Court said: “[Marbury] declared the basic principle that the

24

Id. (“Numerous delegates criticized this attempt to give Congress unbounded control over state lawmaking.”).

25

Id.

26

Id. at 795 (O’Connor, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).

27

“The United States Constitution (unlike those of many other nations) does not explicitly grant the judicial review
power asserted in Marbury.” KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN & GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 13 (14th ed.
2001).

28

5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803) (“It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the
law is. Those who apply the rule to particular cases, must of necessity expound and interpret that rule.”). See also
SULLIVAN AND GUNTHER, supra note 27, at 13 (“Critics of Marbury stress that Marshall’s opinion lacks reference to
authoritative sources for such a power: that the Constitution does not explicitly authorize judicial review; that the
Framers did not clearly intend to grant that extraordinary power; and that the pre-Convention theories and practices
were not sufficiently clear and widespread to provide legitimation.”).
29

358 U.S. 1 (1958).

30

347 U.S. 483 (1954).

8

federal judiciary is supreme in the exposition of the law of the Constitution….It follows that the
interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment enunciated by this Court in the Brown case is the
supreme law of the land, and Art. VI of the constitution makes it of binding effect on the States
‘any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.’” 31
In light of the Court’s statement that “the federal judiciary” has the final word on the
meaning of the constitution, one could certainly argue that all federal judge-made law
interpreting the constitution and federal statutory law is “the supreme law of the land.” But a
majority of courts that have considered the question have held otherwise.32 Why is this the case?
In the following section, this paper will examine some of the possible arguments for and against
binding state courts to lower federal court interpretations of federal law.
III.

Arguments for and Against the Rule
1. Uniformity Concerns

The importance of uniformity in federal law has long been recognized, and was one of
the primary justifications made in support of the conclusion that the Supreme Court has the
power to review state court interpretations of federal law. In Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, 33 Justice
Story made the following uniformity argument in support of that power:
A motive of another kind, perfectly compatible with the most sincere respect for
state tribunals, might induce the grant of appellate power over their decisions.
That motive is the importance, and even necessity of uniformity of decisions
throughout the whole United States, upon all subjects within the purview of the
constitution. Judges of equal learning and integrity, in different states, might
differently interpret [federal law]: if there were no revising authority to control
these jarring and discordant judgments, and harmonize them into uniformity, the
laws, the treaties and the constitution of the United States would be different in
different states, and might, perhaps never have precisely the same construction,
31

Cooper, 358 U.S. at 18 (quoting the Supremacy Clause, U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2).

32

See supra note 3.

33

14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816).

9

obligation, or efficacy in any two states. The public mischiefs that would attend
such a state of things would be truly deplorable[.] 34
If uniformity is of such great value, then perhaps it would make sense to bind state courts to the
precedent of the circuit court that encompasses their geographical area. As it stands, the
constitution is indeed “different in different states.” For example, suppose that the Supreme
Court has interpreted the Fourth Amendment to preclude x, and has indicated in dicta that y may
also be precluded for the same reasons. The Colorado Supreme Court has held that the Fourth
Amendment does preclude y, but the New Mexico Supreme Court has held that it does not. 35
Thus, a criminal defendant in Colorado has greater protections under the federal constitution than
does a criminal defendant in New Mexico. This problem could be obviated if both New Mexico
and Colorado state courts were required to adhere to Tenth Circuit precedent.
This argument, however, has two main shortcomings. First, while uniformity would be
enhanced, federal law would still not be uniform across the nation. Different federal circuit
courts would likely disagree on the issue until the Supreme Court resolved it. Thus a New
Mexico defendant might have the same protections as a Colorado defendant, but would still have

34

Id. at 347-48.

35

State courts are not permitted to interpret the federal constitution so as to impose restrictions on state action that
the U.S. Supreme Court has declined to impose. See, e.g., Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714, 719 (1975) (“[A] state
may not impose such greater restrictions as a matter of federal constitutional law when this Court specifically
refrains from imposing them.”); State v. Cardenas-Alvarez, 2001-NMSC-017, ¶ 42, 25 P.3d 225, 242 (Baca, J.,
concurring in the result) (“New Mexico courts do not have the authority to depart from United States Supreme Court
precedent by providing greater protection under the Fourth Amendment.”). Presumably, however, when the
Supreme Court has left a question open, rather than definitively answering it, a state is permitted to answer the
question as a matter of federal constitutional law. See, e.g., J & J Const. Co. v. Bricklayers and Allied Craftsmen,
Local 1, 664 N.W.2d 728, 757 (Mich. 2003) (Cavanagh, J., dissenting) (“The majority’s reliance on Sullivan [which
reiterated that states could not impose restrictions on state action under the federal constitution that the Supreme
Court has ‘specifically refrained’ from imposing] is also misplaced because the United States Supreme Court has not
‘specifically refrained’ from applying the actual-malice standard to private-figure plaintiffs in Petition Clause
defamation claims. This remains, as acknowledged by the majority, a question not yet decided by the United States
Supreme Court.”). Of course, states are also free to use their own constitutions to offer protections greater than
those mandated by the federal constitution. Hass, 420 U.S. at 719 (“[A] state is free as a matter of its own law to
impose greater restrictions on police activity than those this Court holds to be necessary upon federal constitutional
standards.”).

10

protections different from those afforded to a defendant in a state within a different circuit.
Second, uniformity is arguably sufficiently furthered by having one court (the Supreme Court)
that acts as the final word on all matters of federal law. Indeed, in Martin, Justice Story spoke of
a “revising authority,” indicating that one reviewing court is sufficient to harmonize differing
interpretations of federal law. 36 Nonetheless, until the Supreme Court does harmonize such
differing interpretations, there will be a lack of uniformity in different courts, which could result
in inefficiency and abuses of the system.
2. Forum Shopping
One practical downside to the lack of uniformity that could result from not requiring state
courts to follow circuit precedent is that similarly situated litigants might be subject to different
interpretations of federal law depending on whether the litigation takes place in state or federal
court. This situation could encourage forum shopping. Consider the following hypothetical. 37
The Albuquerque Police Department has a valid warrant to search Dudley
Defendant’s house. Several officers knock on his door, wait fifteen seconds, and
then break the door down and enter the house. Ultimately, no charges are filed
against Dudley, but he decides to file suit against the police officers and the City
of Albuquerque under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, on the grounds that they violated his
Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures.
Dudley also includes a claim for trespass under state tort law. In Smith v. Jones,
the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that police officers must “knock and announce”
themselves before breaking into a suspect’s residence, and that Fourth
Amendment rights are violated if the police do not wait at least 5 seconds between
knocking and entering the residence with force. In Smith, the Supreme Court
declined to decide exactly what period of time would satisfy the Fourth
Amendment, but indicated in dicta that 5 seconds was likely not nearly long
enough. Subsequently, the Tenth Circuit, using the policy and rationale of Smith,
36

In Federalist 82, Hamilton referred to the Supreme Court as a tribunal “destined to unite and assimilate the
principles of national justice and the rules of national decisions.” THE FEDERALIST PAPERS 419-20 (Garry Wills
ed., Bantam Books 1982) (1787-88). Interestingly, however, Hamilton also saw no reason why an appeal would not
lie from a state court to a lower federal court. Id. at 420. As discussed in Part III.4 supra, the Supreme Court’s
Rooker-Feldman doctrine has foreclosed this possibility.
37

The legal principles used in this hypothetical are fictitious. They do not attempt to provide a correct statement of
Fourth Amendment law or state tort law, and are presented for purposes of illustration only.

11

ruled that it is sufficient if the police knock and wait 10 seconds before forcefully
entering a residence. The New Mexico Supreme Court, also interpreting the
policy and rationale of Smith, has decided that a forcible entry violates the Fourth
Amendment unless the police first knock and wait at least 20 seconds before
entering. 38
Under these facts, Dudley’s success could depend in part on where he files his claim. 39 If
he files in federal district court in New Mexico, his § 1983 claim should be dismissed on a Rule
12(b)(6) motion—he has failed to state a claim on which relief can be granted because under the
Tenth Circuit precedent, a wait of 15 seconds does not violate a suspect’s Fourth Amendment
rights. If, however, Dudley files in New Mexico state court, his § 1983 claim will not fail as a
matter of law, since the New Mexico Supreme Court has interpreted Smith to mean that police
must wait at least 20 seconds before making a forcible entry.40
Thus, under the facts of this hypothetical, Dudley may be encouraged to “forum shop.” 41
As a practical matter, however, the attempt to forum shop is unlikely to succeed. If Dudley filed
his suit in New Mexico state court, the defendants would have a right to remove the action to the
New Mexico federal district court. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1441, a civil action that could have been
brought in federal court is removable. When the claim arises under federal law, as a suit under §
38

On the ability of state courts to answer federal constitutional questions that have been posed but not answered by
the U.S. Supreme Court, see note 35 supra.
39

Dudley could bring both of these claims in state or federal court. As noted below, see infra note 51, state courts
have, and indeed must exercise, jurisdiction over federal causes of action such as suits under § 1983. A federal court
would have jurisdiction over the state law claim under 28 U.S.C. § 1367, which gives federal courts jurisdiction over
pendent state law claims, so long as those claims form part of the same “case or controversy” as the federal claims.
40

It should be noted that, whether brought in state or federal court, Dudley’s claims against the individual police
officers might be defeated by a qualified immunity defense. Qualified immunity protects individual state actors
from suit when the constitutional right they are alleged to have violated is not defined by “clearly established” law.
See, e.g., Hope v. Pelzer, 536 730, 739 (2002) (“Despite their participation in the constitutionally impermissible
conduct, respondents may nevertheless be shielded from liability for civil damages if their actions did not violate
clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.”) (citations
and quotations omitted).
41

See Daddow v. Carlsbad Mun. Sch. Dist., 120 N.M. 97, 111, 898 P.2d 1235, 1249 (1995) (Frost, J., specially
concurring) (“[T]he majority unnecessarily places us in conflict with the Tenth Circuit and raises the possibility that
a federal claim could successfully be brought in state court which would otherwise fail in federal court.”).
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1983 does, the action is removable without regard to the citizenship of the parties. 42 Thus,
Dudley’s attempt to “forum shop” would likely be defeated—the defendants could remove the
action to the federal district court, which would apply Tenth Circuit precedent and dismiss the §
1983 claim.
The question of forum shopping would become more complicated, however, if Dudley
decided to forego his § 1983 claim and bring only his state law trespass claim in state court. In
response to Dudley’s trespass claim, the officers could set up the following defense: (1) trespass
constitutes unlawful presence on the property of another; 43 (2) we had a valid warrant and we did
not violate Dudley’s Fourth Amendment rights; (3) therefore we were lawfully on his property
and did not commit trespass. Step 2 in this defense presents a question of federal law—the
police officers were only “lawfully” on the property if indeed Dudley’s federal constitutional
rights were not violated. 44 Answering this question will require an interpretation of federal law,
specifically, the law governing what period of time is sufficient to comport with the Fourth
Amendment knock and announce rule.
But despite the need to interpret federal law, the trespass claim arises only under state
law, and, due to the well-pleaded complaint rule, would be unremovable. The well-pleaded
complaint rule dictates that federal question jurisdiction is present only if the plaintiff’s right to
42

28 U.S.C. § 1441 (b) (“Any civil action of which the district courts have original jurisdiction founded on a claim
or right arising under the Constitution, treaties or laws of the United States shall be removable without regard to the
citizenship or residence of the parties.”).

43

“Every unauthorized entry upon the land of another is a trespass which entitles the owner to a verdict for some
damages.” North v. Pub. Serv. Co. of N.M., 94 N.M. 246, 247 (1980) (opinion of Judge Sutin).
44

See, e.g., Collier v. City of Portland, 644 P.2d 1139, 1142 (1982) (action against police officers for trespass,
holding that “Having probable cause to believe that a burglary was being committed and that the perpetrator was
still on the premises, the police were privileged to enter plaintiff’s residence. That being so, defendant was entitled
to a directed verdict on the cause of action for trespass to property.”) (footnotes omitted); Antikiewicz v. Motorists
Mut. Ins. Co., 283 N.W.2d 749, 753 (Mich. App. 1979) vacated on other grounds, 285 N.W.2d 659 (1979)
(“Normally, a public officer who is on the premises of another pursuant to legal authorization is not liable for
trespass. Such officer becomes liable, however, where he acts in excess of his authority.”).

13

relief depends on federal law. 45 The fact that a defense based on federal law is sure to arise is
insufficient to create federal question jurisdiction. 46 Thus, by bringing only a claim based on
state tort law, Dudley can insulate his lawsuit from removal, thereby ensuring that he will gain
the benefit of the New Mexico Supreme Court’s more favorable interpretation of the U.S.
Supreme Court’s knock and announce rule.
The possibility of forum shopping provides support for the argument that state courts
should be bound by circuit precedent—plaintiffs should not be able to obtain a more favorable
interpretation of federal law by filing in state court. On the other hand, it is important to
acknowledge the limited circumstances in which this problem can arise. Many of the cases that
require state courts to interpret federal law are state criminal prosecutions. Obviously, a criminal
defendant has no choice of forum in the first place. In terms of civil actions, any claim that
arises under federal law is removable to federal court. 47 Thus the plaintiff can try to forum shop,
but is likely to be thwarted in that attempt. It is only in cases such as the hypothetical above,
where the interpretation of federal law is required even though the case would be barred from
federal court by operation of the well-pleaded complaint rule, that not binding state courts to
circuit precedent could truly result in forum shopping. This limited possibility of forum
shopping is arguably not sufficient to justify the intrusion into state court decision-making that
would result from depriving state courts of the opportunity to interpret federal law as they see fit
in the absence of governing Supreme Court precedent. That opportunity derives from the unique

45

See, e.g., Merrell Dow Pharm. Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, 808 (1986) (“Under our longstanding
interpretation of the current statutory scheme, the question whether a claim ‘arises under’ federal law must be
determined with reference to the ‘well-pleaded complaint.’”).
46

Id. (“A defense that raises a federal question is inadequate to confer federal jurisdiction.”).

47

28 U.S.C. § 1441(b)
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role of state courts in our system of dual sovereignty, which is addressed in the following
section.
3. The Madisonian Compromise and the Role of State Courts in Our System
of Dual Sovereignty
Article III of the constitution demonstrates that the Framers envisioned an important role
for state courts in litigation involving federal law. Article III established the Supreme Court, but
did not create lower federal courts. Rather, Article III merely states that, “The judicial power of
the United States, shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the
Congress may from time to time ordain and establish.”48 This clause represents what has come
to be known as the Madisonian Compromise. It was a compromise in the sense that one faction
at the Constitutional Convention believed that lower federal courts were necessary since state
courts could not be trusted to uphold federal law, 49 while another faction believed that state
courts would be well suited to deciding cases involving federal law, and that the existence of
lower federal courts would unduly encroach on state sovereignty. 50
In light of the Madisonian Compromise, the Framers clearly assumed that state and
federal courts would have concurrent jurisdiction over cases involving federal law. 51 This
assumption stemmed from two propositions, first, that state courts were courts of general
48

U.S. CONST. Art. III, § 1.

49

ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION 3 (4th ed. 2003) (“Madison argued that state judges were likely to
be biased against federal law and could not be trusted, especially in instances where there were conflicting state and
federal interests.”).
50

Id. (Lower federal courts “were regarded as an encroachment upon the rights of individual states. It was claimed
that the state courts were perfectly competent for the work required….”) (quotations omitted).
51

In the Federalist 82, Alexander Hamilton noted that, “in every case in which they were not expressly excluded by
the future acts of the national legislature, [the state courts] will of course take cognizance of the causes to which
those acts may give birth.”). FEDERALIST PAPERS, supra note 36, at 419. Not only do states have jurisdiction,
unless divested of it by Congress, to entertain claims arising under federal law, but they in fact have no discretion to
decline to exercise that jurisdiction. See, e.g., Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386, 393 (1947) (“[A] state court cannot
refuse to enforce the right arising from the law of the United States because of conceptions of impolicy or want of
wisdom on the part of Congress in having called into play its lawful powers.”) (citations and quotations omitted).
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jurisdiction, presumed competent to hear all cases, 52 and second, that the system of dual
sovereignty meant that state governments and the federal government were “parts of one
whole.” 53 Under the second proposition, a state court ruling on a question of federal law would
not be interpreting the law of a foreign sovereign, but would simply be interpreting its own law.
Thus, despite the distrust of state courts that some of the delegates to the Constitutional
Convention harbored, the Madisonian Compromise clearly signals that state courts were intended
to play an important role in the litigation of claims involving federal law—if it was at least
possible that the Supreme Court would be the only federal court, 54 then it was likely that the bulk
of the work of litigating federal claims would be entrusted to the state courts. 55 If there were no
lower federal courts, the answer to the question posed by this paper would be an easy “no”—if
lower federal courts did not exist, there would be no lower federal court precedent to which state
courts might be bound. Thus the Madisonian Compromise seems to weigh heavily against
binding state courts to lower federal court precedent.

52

FEDERALIST PAPERS, supra note 36, at 419. (“The judiciary power of every government looks beyond its own
local or municipal laws, and in civil cases lays hold of all subjects of litigation between parties within its
jurisdiction, though the causes of dispute are relative to the laws of the most distant part of the globe….”).
53

Id.

54

Notably, with the exception of a few narrow categories, Article III only grants the Supreme Court appellate, and
not original, jurisdiction. Thus, in most cases involving federal law, the Supreme Court would lack jurisdiction to
sit as a trial court, even if it had the time and resources to do so. See U.S. CONST. Art. III, § 2, cl. 2 (“In all Cases
affecting Ambassadors, other Public Ministers and Consuls, and those in which a State shall be Party, the Supreme
Court shall have original Jurisdiction. In all the other Cases before mentioned, the supreme Court shall have
appellate Jurisdiction, both as to Law and Fact, with such Exceptions, and under such Regulations as the Congress
shall make.”).
55

Scholars also note that because Congress did not create general “federal question jurisdiction” until 1875, the
majority of cases involving federal questions were likely litigated in state court prior to that time. See, e.g., Zeigler,
supra note 2, at 1148.
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But more broadly, the Madisonian Compromise raises questions regarding the parity of
state and federal courts that have persisted into the modern era. 56 Are state and federal courts
really equal in their abilities? Can state courts really be trusted to render decisions that are
faithful to federal law and policy? Those who answer this latter question in the negative would
likely approve of a rule that requires state courts to apply circuit precedent on questions of
federal law. If state courts are not to be trusted, it makes sense to “micromanage” them by
requiring them to apply circuit law rather than developing their own answers to questions of
federal law that have not yet been answered by the U.S. Supreme Court.
The Supreme Court has often asserted that state courts are just as competent as federal
courts in applying federal law. For example, in Stone v. Powell, 57 the Supreme Court stated:
Despite differences in institutional environment and the unsympathetic attitude to
federal constitutional claims of some state judges in years past, we are unwilling
to assume that there now exists a general lack of appropriate sensitivity to
constitutional rights in the trial and appellate courts of the several States. State
courts, like federal courts, have a constitutional obligation to safeguard personal
liberties and to uphold federal law. . . . there is no intrinsic reason why the fact
that a man is a federal judge should make him more competent or
conscientious . . . than his neighbor in the state courthouse. 58
Justice Scalia, in particular, has often noted the parity between state and federal courts. Arguing
against a rule that treats habeus corpus petitions coming out of state convictions differently from
those coming out of federal convictions, he said,
T[he] structure [of our national system] establishes this Court as the supreme
judicial interpreter of the Federal Constitution and laws, but gives other federal
courts no higher or more respected a role than state courts in applying that ‘Law
56

See generally CHEMERINSKY, supra note 49, § 1.5.

57

428 U.S. 465 (1976).

58

Id. at 494 n. 35 (citations and quotations omitted).
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of the Land’—which it says all state courts are bound by, and all state judges must
be sworn to uphold. It would be a strange constitution that regards state courts as
second-rate instruments for the vindication of federal rights and yet makes no
mandatory provision for lower federal courts (as our Constitution does not.) 59
In keeping with the notion of parity, there are several doctrines, both statutory and judgemade, that require federal courts to stay their hands, in part out of deference to the ability of state
courts to interpret federal law. For example, the Anti Injunction Act 60 dictates that a federal
court may not enjoin a proceeding pending in state court unless one of three narrow exceptions is
met. 61 Similarly, the judge-made abstention doctrines 62 are designed to ensure that federal
courts do not improperly interfere with state courts, and that state courts are left to interpret
federal law as they see fit when a case is properly before them. 63 The Anti Injunction Act and
the abstention doctrines demonstrate mechanisms that have been put in place, either by Congress
59

Withrow v. Williams, 507 U.S. 680, 723 (Scalia, J., dissenting).

60

28 U.S.C. § 2283.

61

“A court of the United States may not grant an injunction to stay proceedings in a state court except as expressly
authorized by Act of Congress, or where necessary in aid of its jurisdiction, or to protect or effectuate its
judgments.” Id. Interestingly, however, the Supreme Court has found that suits brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the
federal statute that has served as the primary vehicle for civil rights litigation over the past 50 years, are exempted
from the Anti Injunction Act. Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225 (1972). The Court based this holding on the
legislative history of § 1983, noting Congress’s recognition that state courts could not always be trusted to faithfully
apply federal law and protect federally granted rights: “[The] legislative history [of § 1983] makes evident that
Congress clearly conceived that it was altering the relationship between the States and the Nation with respect to the
protection of federally created rights; it was concerned that state instrumentalities could not protect those rights; it
realized that state officers might, in fact, be antipathetic to the vindication of those rights; and it believed that these
failings extended to the state courts.” Id. at 242.
62

The abstention doctrines counsel that under certain circumstances where a federal court does have jurisdiction, it
should decline to exercise that jurisdiction out of deference to state courts . There are several different kinds of
abstention. For an explanation of each type, see generally CHEMERINSKY, supra note 49, chapters 12-14.
63

The type of abstention that best demonstrates this principle is so-called “Younger” abstention. In Younger v.
Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), the Supreme Court held that, absent a showing of bad faith or harassment, a federal
court should not enjoin a pending state criminal proceeding on the grounds that the state criminal statute being
enforced is facially unconstitutional. Id. at 54. The Court based its decision not only on notions of comity and the
traditional requirements for obtaining injunctive relief, but also on what it referred to as “Our Federalism,” which it
characterized as “a system in which there is sensitivity to the legitimate interests of both State and National
Governments, and in which the National Government, anxious though it may be to vindicate and protect federal
rights and federal interests, always endeavors to do so in ways that will not unduly interfere with the legitimate
activities of the States.” Id. at 44. The Court further noted that the criminal defendant had every right argue in the
state court criminal proceeding that the state statute was unconstitutional. Id. at 49.
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or by the federal courts, to respect the decision-making of state courts, and to avoid
“micromanaging” state court proceedings.
Nonetheless, there are other mechanisms in our legal system that undermine the notion
that state courts are equally competent and should be trusted to faithfully interpret federal law.
The most notable among these mechanisms is the writ of habeus corpus. The writ allows a
prisoner being held in either state or federal custody 64 to petition a federal court for release,
arguing that he or she is being held in violation of federal law. 65 A habeus corpus proceeding,
which can be brought only after a prisoner has exhausted all state remedies, 66 is a civil action
that provides for collateral attack of state court proceedings. 67 As such, it is a major exception to
the general rule that lower federal courts may not review judgments of state courts. 68 Proponents
of habeus relief “expressly challenge the parity between federal and state courts and argue that
structural differences between federal and state courts mandate that federal courts be available to
protect federal rights.” 69 Thus, the availability of habeus relief demonstrates that our system
does not always trust state courts to fairly interpret and protect federal rights. 70

64

Initially, federal habeus corpus proceedings were available only to those held in federal custody, but following the
Civil War, Congress expanded the writ to allow for review of state court convictions. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 49,
§ 15.2.
65

Id. § 15.1.

66

See generally id. § 15.4.2 (“An extremely important limitation on the power of federal courts to hear habeus
corpus petitions is the requirement that petitioners in state custody exhaust all available state court procedures prior
to seeking federal court review.”).
67

Id. § 15.1.

68

See Part III.4, infra, discussing the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.

69

Id. § 15.1, at 863-64.

70

There are other examples of how we do not always trust state courts to interpret federal law. On occasion,
Congress has provided for federal jurisdiction in cases that would otherwise be relegated completely to state court.
One example is the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, which created federal jurisdiction for contract
disputes between employers and labor organizations. 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (“Suits for violation of contracts between
an employer and a labor organization . . . may be brought in any district court of the United States having
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On balance, however, our system is based on a presumption that state courts are proper
arbiters of federal rights and can be trusted to safeguard those rights. Since that presumption is
so fundamental to our system, it seems to make most sense to allow state courts to fashion their
own interpretations of federal law, absent governing Supreme Court precedent, rather than
“micromanaging” state courts by requiring them to follow lower federal court decisional law.
Indeed, state courts arguably have an obligation to exercise their power to interpret federal law in
an independent fashion, rather than giving blind deference to the opinions of the lower federal
courts. The Ohio Supreme Court came to this conclusion in State v. Burnett. 71 In Burnett, a
criminal defendant challenged a section of the Cincinnati Municipal Code on constitutional
grounds. 72 In a prior unrelated case, the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Ohio had
struck down the ordinance as unconstitutional. 73 The Ohio Supreme Court decided that it was
not bound by the federal district court decision, and in fact determined that it had a duty to
conduct its own independent analysis of the defendant’s constitutional arguments. 74 Noting that
the U.S. Supreme Court has yet to definitively answer the question of whether state courts are
bound by lower federal court precedent, the court said, “we are reluctant to abandon our role in
the system of federalism created by the United States Constitution until the United States
Supreme Court directs us otherwise. Both inferior federal courts and state courts serve as
laboratories for experimentation to devise various solutions where the best solution is far from
jurisdiction of the parties, without respect to the amount in controversy or without regard to the citizenship of the
parties.”). See also Textile Workers Union of America v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957). Another principle
demonstrating a lack of faith in state courts is the Supreme Court’s holding that § 1983 litigation is not subject to the
prohibitions of the Anti Injunction Act. See supra note 61.
71

755 N.E.2d 857 (Ohio 2001).

72

Id. at 421 (citing Chapter 755 of the Cincinnati Municipal Code).

73

Id. at 421-22 (citing Johnson v. Cincinnati, 119 F.Supp2d 735 (S.D. Ohio 2000)).

74

Id. at 424.
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clear.” 75 Given the unique role of state courts in our nation’s system of dual sovereignty,
perhaps the Ohio Supreme Court was correct in recognizing its responsibility to conduct an
independent constitutional analysis. Another facet of the unique relationship between state and
federal courts that bears on the proper treatment of circuit precedent in state courts is the fact
that, generally, lower federal courts may not review state court judgments. That facet is taken up
in the next section.
4. State Courts Do Not Occupy an “Inferior” Relationship to Lower Federal
Courts
Under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, lower federal courts lack jurisdiction to review final
judicial decisions of state courts. In Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 76 the plaintiffs filed a bill in
equity in a United States District Court to have a judgment of the Indiana Supreme Court
declared null and void on the grounds that the judgment violated various provisions of the United
States Constitution. 77 The Supreme Court held that lower federal courts have only original
jurisdiction, and thus lack jurisdiction to review the judgments of state courts: “Under the
legislation of Congress, no court of the United States other than this court could entertain a
proceeding to reverse or modify the judgment for errors of that character. To do so would be an
exercise of appellate jurisdiction. The jurisdiction possessed by the District Courts is strictly
original.” 78
75

Id. (citations and quotations omitted).

76

263 U.S. 413 (1923).

77

Id. at 415.

78

Id. at 416. Rooker was reaffirmed more recently in District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S.
462 (1983). In Feldman, the Supreme Court clarified what constitutes a judicial proceeding in state court, from
which an appeal to the lower federal courts does not lie. While Rooker itself only speaks to the inability of federal
district courts to review state court judgments, it seems to have also been interpreted to preclude such review by
federal appellate courts. See CHEMERNINSKY, supra note 49, § 15.1 n.1 (referring to the holding in Rooker as,
“federal courts lack jurisdiction to review state court decisions.”).
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The Rooker-Feldman doctrine serves to afford deference to state courts, and to promote
federalism. 79 It also means that state courts are not “lower” courts with respect to the lower
federal courts, because under the common law structure, “lower” court decisions are reviewable
by “higher” courts. 80 Both courts 81 and commentators 82 have recognized that the inability of
lower federal courts to review state court judgments weighs against binding state courts to lower
federal court decisions. Few courts that have discussed the issue have provided much analysis,
but the conclusion has common sense appeal—it would simply be inconsistent with the
traditional common law hierarchy to bind one court to precedent from another court that does not
exercise some sort of supervisory control over the first court.
IV.

How New Mexico Courts Treat Tenth Circuit Law—A Casestudy of the Rule
in Practice

Even if state courts should not be bound by lower federal court decisions, should those
decisions nonetheless be especially persuasive authority for a state court that must interpret
federal law? The arguments that could be made for binding state courts to lower federal court
precedent, such as furthering uniformity and discouraging forum shopping, also serve as reasons

79

See, e.g., Gilbert v. Ferry, 298 F.Supp 2d 606, 613 (E.D. Mich. 2003) (“The Rooker-Feldman Doctrine promotes
firmly-held notions of federalism and comity by preserving the integrity of the state court decision-making process
and the repose of state court judgments.”) (citations and quotations omitted).

80

Cf. Alexander v. Delgado, 84 N.M. 717, 718, 507 P.2d 778, 779 (1973) (“[I]t is not considered good form for a
lower court to reverse a superior one….The general rule is that a court lower in rank than the court which made the
decision invoked as a precedent cannot deviate therefrom and decide contrary to that precedent, irrespective of
whether it considers the rule laid down therein as correct or incorrect.”) (citations and quotations omitted).
81

See, e.g., Hinterlong v. Baldwin, 720 N.E.2d 315, 323 (Ill. Ct. App. 1999) (“Federal courts exercise no appellate
jurisdiction over state courts; therefore decisions of the lower federal courts are not binding on state courts….”);
State v. Mechtel, 499 N.W.2d 662 (Wis. 1993) (“[B]ecause lower federal courts exercise no appellate jurisdiction
over state tribunals, decisions of lower federal courts are not conclusive on state courts.”);
82

See, e.g., Evan H. Caminker, Why Must Inferior Courts Obey Superior Court Precedents?, 46 STAN. L. REV. 817,
825 (1994) (“But the state and territorial judges are not bound by precedents established by courts that do not have
the authority to review those judges’ decisions, since, as in the Article III regime, authority to establish precedent
follows the path of appellate review. Thus a state court need not follow the holdings of any inferior federal
court….”).
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why state courts perhaps should, as a prudential matter, defer to the decisions of the lower
federal courts on issues of federal law. This section will examine how New Mexico courts have
treated lower federal court decisional law, to see whether our state does pay special deference to
Tenth Circuit decisions in cases requiring the interpretation of federal law.
New Mexico courts have stated that they are not bound by Tenth Circuit opinions in
interpreting federal law. 83 However, there have been statements to the contrary as well.84 On
balance, New Mexico courts seem to recognize that they are not bound by Tenth Circuit
decisions, but it seems as though, when they want to follow those decisions, they tend to use
language indicating that deference is due to the circuit.
The New Mexico case that best demonstrates these conflicting views is State v.
Cardenas-Alvarez. 85 In that case, the defendant was stopped at a border patrol checkpoint in
southern New Mexico by a federal agent. 86 After asking the defendant several questions, the
agent became suspicious, and ordered the defendant to a “secondary inspection area.” 87 The
agent then obtained the defendant’s consent to search the vehicle and to allow a drug dog to sniff
around the vehicle. 88 Federal agents eventually discovered 85 pounds of marijuana in the

83

“[O]ur courts are not required to adopt the reasoning of the Tenth Circuit.” State v. Frank, 2002-NMSC-026, ¶
22, 52 P.3d 404, 409.
84

See, e.g., State v. Snyder, 1998-NMCA-166, ¶ 9, 967 P.2d 843, 846 (“In applying federal law, we follow the
precedent established by the federal courts, particularly the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit.”);
State v. Fierro, 1996-NMCA-028, ¶7, 911 P.2d 1202, 1203 (“[D]ecisions of [the] Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals
effectively govern law applied in this state that would be reviewable in habeus corpus proceedings.”).
85

2001-NMSC-017, 25 P.3d 225.

86

Id. ¶ 2, 25 P.3d at 227.

87

Id. ¶ 3, 25 P.3d at 227.

88

Id. ¶ 4, 25 P.3d at 227.
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defendant’s gas tank. 89 At the trial, the defendant moved to suppress the drugs, arguing that the
agent did not have the “reasonable suspicion of criminal activity” that would have been required
to detain him for more than the “initial questioning.” 90 The trial judge denied the motion, but the
court of appeals reversed the conviction on the ground that the extended detention violated the
defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights. 91 The New Mexico Supreme Court affirmed the ruling
of the court of appeals, but on different grounds.92
As the court in Cardenas-Alvarez noted, New Mexico uses the “interstitial” approach to
constitutional questions. 93 Under the interstitial approach, a court should first determine whether
a defendant’s federal constitutional rights have been violated.94 Then, only if that question is
answered in the negative, the court should go on to determine whether state constitutional rights
have been violated. 95 The majority in Cardenas-Alvarez found that the defendant’s federal
constitutional rights had not been violated, but that his rights under the New Mexico Constitution
had been. 96 Justice Serna concurred in the result, but felt that the defendant’s Fourth
Amendment rights had been violated, making it unnecessary to reach the state constitutional

89

Id.

90

Id. ¶ 5, 25 P.3d at 228.

91

Id.

92

Id.

93

Id. ¶ 6, 25 P.3d at 228.

94

Id.

95

Id. ¶ 7, 25 P.3d at 228.

96

Id. ¶ 5, 25 P.3d at 228.

24

question. 97 It is useful to first examine Justice Serna’s opinion, as it nicely demonstrates the
contrasting views on how Tenth Circuit precedent should be used.
Justice Serna stated that the majority “relie[d] on Tenth Circuit case law” to reach its
decision that the Fourth Amendment had not been violated. 98 He felt that the majority had
correctly interpreted the Tenth Circuit cases, but that those Tenth Circuit cases had themselves
misinterpreted United States Supreme Court precedent. 99 Justice Serna noted that New Mexico
courts are bound by the Supreme Court’s interpretation of federal law, but stated, “where the
issue has not been explicitly resolved by the Supreme Court, we are not bound in our search for
the meaning of the Fourth Amendment by the Tenth Circuit’s interpretation of Supreme Court
precedent. Tenth Circuit case law on the subject is merely persuasive, albeit substantially
persuasive, authority.” 100 He felt that prior New Mexico cases had correctly interpreted Supreme
Court precedent in this area, and that those cases, rather than the Tenth Circuit cases, should be
followed. 101
The majority indeed “relied” on the Tenth Circuit cases in reaching its conclusion that the
defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights had not been violated. The part of the majority opinion
that deals with the Fourth Amendment relies exclusively on Tenth Circuit cases. In fact, it
repeatedly uses the phrase “under federal law,” and then cites only Tenth Circuit cases. 102 In a

97

Id. ¶ 57, 25 P.3d at 248-49 (Serna, J., concurring in result).

98

Id. ¶ 58, 25 P.3d at 249 (Serna, J, concurring in result).

99

Id.

100

Id. (citations omitted). In reaching this conclusion, Justice Serna cited Justice Thomas’s concurring opinion in
Lockhart, see text accompanying note 12, supra.
101

Id.

102

See, e.g., id ¶ 7 (“Under federal law, Defendant’s detention constituted a routine border checkpoint stop….); ¶ 9
(“Under federal law, Defendant’s detention was not excessive in scope or duration.”); ¶ 10 (“Because federal law
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footnote, the majority addressed Justice Serna’s conclusion that prior New Mexico cases, rather
than the Tenth Circuit cases, demonstrated the proper approach under the Fourth Amendment:
“While our Court of Appeals’ cases represent a sound approach to border checkpoints under the
New Mexico Constitution, we believe that in light of [the Tenth Circuit cases], they misinterpret
the federal law they purport to apply.” 103 Interestingly, however, the court of appeals case that
the majority refers to as having been relied on by Justice Serna was clearly decided under the
Fourth Amendment and makes no mention of the New Mexico Constitution. 104
Notably, while the majority opinion relies exclusively on Tenth Circuit cases, it makes no
mention of being bound by those cases. 105 Nonetheless, the majority’s reliance on the Tenth
Circuit cases, and its repeated use of the phrase “under federal law,” suggests that the majority
may have viewed those cases as constituting the “federal law” that it was required to apply. In
contrast, Justice Serna viewed the Tenth Circuit cases as “merely persuasive,” pointing out that
the New Mexico Supreme Court was free to ignore them. Thus Cardenas-Alvarez may
demonstrate a disagreement among members of the court regarding the appropriate treatment of
Tenth Circuit precedent.
There is, however, another possibility: the majority and Justice Serna may have only
disagreed about the substantive law itself, rather than about the proper role of circuit precedent in

does not protect the right asserted by Defendant….”); ¶ 10 (“Under federal law the dismantling of a vehicle is
generally found to be reasonable and within the parameters of a general consent.”).
103

Id. ¶ 9, 25 P.3d at 229 n.1.

104

See State v. Estrada, 111 N.M. 798, 799 (Ct. App. 1991) (“The question in this case is whether the fourth
amendment to the United States Constitution was violated when defendant was referred to the secondary area and
asked to exit his car while the dog sniff was performed.”).
105

The majority opinion was authored by Justice Franchini. Interestingly, in an opinion that he had authored several
years previously, the court declined to follow Tenth Circuit law on a federal question. See Daddow v. Carlsbad
Mun. Sch. Dist., 120 N.M. 97, 898 P.2d 1235 (1995), discussed at notes 119-25 infra. Thus it seems unlikely that
the Cardenas-Alvarez majority actually thought itself bound by the Tenth Circuit cases.
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state court decision-making. Justice Serna would not have applied the Tenth Circuit cases,
because he believed that the Tenth Circuit had gotten it wrong. The majority, while it did not
provide much discussion on the point, must have believed that the Tenth Circuit had gotten it
right. Thus, the majority and concurring opinions demonstrate that the way in which a court
treats circuit precedent may depend on the desired outcome of the case. In other words, the
Cardenas-Alvarez majority may have simply followed the Tenth Circuit cases because it agreed
with their reasoning, just as it might follow the reasoning of any other out-of-jurisdiction case
with which it agreed. But in order to strengthen its decision, the majority repeatedly used the
phrase “under federal law,” hinting, without ever saying so, that those cases were determinative.
Other New Mexico cases involving contraband seizure by federal agents raise the
interesting question of whether there are certain substantive areas of the law in which extra
deference to circuit precedent is warranted. In State v. Fierro, 106 the defendant was stopped by a
Border Patrol agent, who apparently seized some marijuana from her car. The court noted that
such a stop must be “justified by specific articulable facts warranting a reasonable suspicion that
unlawful activity is afoot,” 107 and, relying on a Tenth Circuit case that involved “strikingly
similar” facts, held that the reasonable suspicion must be “particularized to the defendant.” 108
To support its reliance on the Tenth Circuit case, the court cited to a previous New Mexico case,
State v. Lucero, 109 and included the following parenthetical citation to that case: “(decisions of
[the] Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals effectively govern law applied in this state that would be

106

1996-NMCA-028, 911 P.2d 1202.

107

Id. ¶ 4, 911 P.2d at 1203.

108

Id. ¶ 5, 911 P.2d at 1203 (citing United States v. Mansisvais, 907 F.2d 984 (10th Cir. 1990)).

109

97 N.M. 346, 639 P.2d 1200 (Ct. App. 1981).
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reviewable in habeus corpus proceedings.)” 110 Judge Hartz wrote a brief special concurrence
where he “agreed” that the Tenth Circuit case relied on by the majority was “controlling.” 111 He
further stated that because both cases involved “agents of the United States Border Patrol, who
are bound to obey federal law, we should be particularly deferential to opinions of the United
States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit.” 112
The Fierro court’s parenthetical reference to Lucero raises the inference that extra
deference is due to Tenth Circuit law when there is a possibility of habeus review. Aside from
that parenthetical, the court made no reference to habeus review, or the proper treatment of
circuit cases. Other courts, however, have noted that it makes sense to give extra deference to
circuit precedent when it is possible that a case will eventually end up in the circuit court on a
habeus petition. The rationale for this deference is that it would be inefficient for a state court to
refuse relief on a ground on which the relevant federal court would later grant habeus relief. 113
As a practical matter, however, the Fierro court’s reference to Lucero is troubling in two
ways. First, any concern about the court’s decision being overturned on habeus review is
misplaced, as the U.S. Supreme Court has ruled that Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule claims
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are generally not reviewable on habeus. 114 Second, the parenthetical citation to Lucero is an
inaccurate characterization. Lucero involved a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. The
Lucero court noted that the test in New Mexico for ineffective assistance of counsel was the
“sham, farce, or mockery” test. 115 That test that been used in the Tenth Circuit for some time,
but the circuit had subsequently replaced it with a less stringent test. 116 The Lucero court did
refer to the Tenth Circuit as “the federal appellate court which decides complaints in our
geographical area concerning State violations of constitutional rights under habeus corpus
proceedings.” 117 However the court made no further mention of habeus proceedings or the
function of Tenth Circuit caselaw in New Mexico state courts. In fact, the court declined to
adopt the less stringent Tenth Circuit test, noting that if the rule was going to be changed, that
was a decision for the New Mexico Supreme Court and not the court of appeals. 118
Given the serious inaccuracies in the Fierro court’s citation to Lucero, it seems likely that
the court simply made a mistake. On the other hand, it is at least possible that the court’s
mischaracterization of Lucero was influenced by its desire to justify its heavy reliance on Tenth
Circuit precedent. If so, Fierro presents another example of the way in which New Mexico
courts’ characterization of Tenth Circuit law is dependant on the outcome desired in a particular
case.
Judge Hartz’s special concurrence in Fierro also suggests that perhaps when unique
federal interests are implicated, more deference to federal law is appropriate. While Judge Hartz
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did not give any explanation for his statement, one can imagine policy reasons that underlie his
concern. For example, it makes sense for the conduct of federal agents to be governed by one
uniform standard. Perhaps agents are routinely transferred between different border checkpoints.
If so, it would be difficult for them to familiarize themselves with the laws of different states in
order to make sure that their conduct conforms to the laws of the state in which they are working
on a particular occasion. On the other hand, Judge Hartz’s suggestion that the law should be
uniform because federal agents are “bound to obey federal law” may raise a false problem, since
state actors are certainly bound to follow federal constitutional law as well. From a cynical point
of view, this false problem again raises the inference that New Mexico courts counsel deference
to circuit precedent only when they happen to agree with that precedent.
On other occasions, however, New Mexico courts have felt free to diverge from Tenth
Circuit law. In Daddow v. Carlsbad Municipal School District, 119 the New Mexico Supreme
Court had to decide whether a local school board was an “arm of the state,” so as to benefit from
Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity. Under U.S. Supreme Court caselaw, the “arm of the
state” inquiry is a question of federal law, but is determined with reference to the state law that
defines and governs the entity at issue. 120 Prior to the Daddow case, the Tenth Circuit had
decided that school boards in New Mexico were arms of the state. 121 In Daddow, the New
Mexico Supreme Court declined to follow the Tenth Circuit case, concluding that the circuit had

119

120 N.M. 97, 898 P.2d 1235 (1995).

120

See, e.g., Regents of the Univ. of Calif. v. Doe, 519 U.S. 425, 430 (1997) (“Ultimately, of course, the question
whether a particular state agency has the same kind of independent status as a county or is instead an arm of the
State…is a question of federal law. But that federal question can be answered only after considering the provisions
of state law that define the agency’s character.”).
121

Martinez v. Bd. of Educ. of Taos Mun. Sch. Dist., 748 F.2d 1393 (1984), overruled by Duke v. Grady Mun. Sch.,
127 F.3d 972 (1997).

30

failed to consider all of the factors made relevant by Supreme Court precedent. 122 Justice Frost
specially concurred, finding that there was no need to reach the arm of the state question. But,
he said, the majority holding “unnecessarily places us in conflict with the Tenth Circuit and
raises the possibility that a federal claim could successfully be brought in state court which
would otherwise fail in federal court.” 123 Thus, Justice Frost seemed concerned about the
possibility of forum shopping, as discussed in Part III.2 above.
Daddow demonstrates that the New Mexico Supreme Court is comfortable ignoring
Tenth Circuit precedent when it feels the circuit is incorrect. It is interesting to note, however,
that the court did so in this case where the “federal question” it had to answer is determined by
reference to state law. 124 It has long been established that state courts are the final arbiters of the
meaning of state law. 125 Thus while the New Mexico Supreme Court is obviously bound by U.S.
Supreme Court precedent regarding what factors should be considered in determining whether an
entity is an arm of the state, the court is the final arbiter of the meaning of the state statutes that
must be analyzed to finally answer that question. As such, the court may have felt freer than
usual to depart from Tenth Circuit precedent.
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On balance then, it seems that New Mexico are well aware that they are not bound by
Tenth Circuit precedent. However, the language that they use in discussing circuit precedent
often seems to depend on what approach is best suited to the outcome desired in the particular
case. Thus, one could argue that Tenth Circuit law receives little more deference from the New
Mexico courts than any other out-of-jurisdiction caselaw, but that when it suits them, the courts
pay lip service to the idea that extra deference is owed. As several New Mexico judges and
justices have noted, diverging from circuit precedent defeats uniformity and has the potential to
encourage forum shopping. Nonetheless, like the Ohio Supreme Court in State v. Burnett, 126
New Mexico courts seem to have taken seriously their responsibility to conduct their own
independent analysis of federal law.
V.

Conclusion

Although there seems to be no real pedigree for the rule that state courts are not bound by
lower federal court decisions on questions of federal law, the courts who have adopted that rule
seem to have gotten it right. Despite concerns about lack of uniformity and the potential for
forum shopping, our federalist system seems to counsel giving state courts the opportunity to
interpret federal law as they see fit in the first instance. If they get it wrong, the Supreme Court
can then step in, correct the error, and provide a uniform rule for all courts. In the meantime,
state courts have an obligation to interpret federal law in a manner that affords deference to
circuit precedent where appropriate, but preserves the role of the state court as an independent
decision maker within a federalist system.
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